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The Antagonism Between Freedom of
Speech and Seditious Libel
By JUNE EICHBAUM*
Introduction
One of the greatest ironies in the history of the United States was the
Sedition Act of 1798.1 Enacted shortly after the adoption of the First
Amendment, which guarantees the freedoms of speech and press to all
citizens, this Act was designed to silence voices critical of the federal
government. In providing a statutory ground for prosecution of those who
spoke against the President or Congress, the Sedition Act drew upon the
British common law crime of seditious libel. Convictions secured under this
Act's harsh edict, however, never came before the Supreme Court for
constitutional review,2 although the Court did have occasion to rule in one
common law prosecution for seditious libel that federal tribunals are without
common law jurisdiction in criminal cases.
3
The Sedition Act, which expired in 1801, has been posthumously
regretted as a constitutionally impermissible abrogation of the rights of
freedom of speech and press. In New York Times v. Sullivan,4 the Court
decried the Act as "inconsistent with the First Amendment" because of
"the restraint it imposed upon criticism of government and public offi-
cials. '"5 The view that the First Amendment, by its own terms, repudiated
the very concept of seditious libel was first espoused by Justice Holmes in
his dissent in Abrams v. United States,6 in which Justice Brandeis joined.
* B.A., 1972, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., 1975, Georgetown University Law
Center; LL.M., 1978, New York University. Member, New York har.
1. Ch. 74, §§ 1-4, 1 Stat. 596 (1798), reprinted in J. SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE
ALIENAND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES, app. at 441-42 (1956) [hereinafter
cited as FREEDOM'S FETTERS].
2. This historical omission is noted in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,276
(1964). See also Emerson, Colonial Intentions and Current Realities of the First Amendment,
125 U. PA. L. REV. 737, 738-39 (1977).
3. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
4. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In this case, the Court held that a state can award damages to a
public official for defamation only if actual malice is proven. Id. at 279-80.
5. Id. at 276.
6. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
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I wholly disagree with the argument of the Government that the
First Amendment left the common law as to seditious libel in
force. History seems to be against the notion. I had conceived that
the United States through many years had shown its repentance
for the Sedition Act of 1798 .... by repaying fines that it
imposed.
7
Scrutinized under present First Amendment standards, it seems most
unlikely that the Sedition Act would survive constitutional challenge.' The
possibility of criminal prosecution for open criticism of the federal govern-
ment is at odds with a "profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and
that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials." 9 For this reason, prose-
cution for seditious libel has been condemned as a blatantly political under-
taking. In the words of Justice Black, "[s]editious libel as it has been put
into practice throughout the centuries, is nothing in the world except the
prosecution of people who are on the wrong side politically; they have said
something and their group has lost and they are prosecuted." 10
Despite the modern consensus, the question whether the First Amend-
ment repudiated seditious libel at the time of its adoption remains open. The
issue is clouded by the dual, and possibly conflicting, interests that the First
Amendment served in 1790. It has been persuasively argued that the pri-
mary purpose of the First Amendment was to reserve to the states exclusive
authority in the area of speech and press regulation.11 According to this
view, guaranteeing the citizen's rights of free speech and press vis-h-vis the
federal government was a secondary purpose.12 Thus, these substantive
rights were extended to the citizen vis-A-vis the state governments only if
secured by the various state constitutions. The national uproar following
7. Id. at 630 (citation omitted) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
8. Some doubt remains, however, as to the constitutionality of state sedition acts. In
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), the Court expanded the New York Times rule such
that state power to impose criminal sanctions for criticism of public officials' conduct was
limited. Justice Douglas expressed the fear that "[tihe philosophy of the Sedition Act of 1798
which punished 'false, scandalous and malicious' writings . . . is today allowed to be applied
by the States. . . . It is disquieting to know that one of its instruments of destruction is abroad
in the land today." Id. at 83 (Douglas, J., concurring, joined by Black, J.).
9. 376 U.S. at 270.
10. Black, Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37
N.Y.U. L. REv. 549, 557 (1962).
11. L. LEVY, Liberty of the Press from Zenger to Jefferson, in JL DMENTS: ESSAYS ON
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 138 (1972) [hereinafter cited as JUDGMENTS]: "The pri-
mary purpose of the First Amendment was to reserve to the states an exclusive authority, as far
as legislation was concerned, in the field of speech and press." See also W. BERNS, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1976) [hereinafter cited as BERNS].
But see Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 5-6 (1948).
12. See generally JUDGMENTS, supra note 11, at 136-38.
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passage of the Sedition Act can thus be explained as a reaction to Congress'
usurpation of state power. The substantive curtailment of speech and press
freedoms, which resulted from implementation of the Act, was a less
important source of national concern. This conclusion finds support both in
the debates and writings of the founding fathers and in the history of state
prosecutions for seditious libel in colonial as well as in post-revolutionary
America.
I. The Original Understanding
The absence of debate in the First Congress complicates the task of
reconstructing the meaning of the rights to freedom of speech and press as
secured by the First Amendment at the time of its adoption. 13 James
Madison viewed the First Amendment as securing maximum protection for
civil liberties. He stated: "The right of freedom of speech is secured; the
liberty of the press is expressly declared to be beyond the reach of this
Government; the people may therefore publicly address their representa-
tives, may privately advise them, or declare their sentiments by petition to
the whole body .... -14 Madison supported a draft of the First Amend-
ment that would have prohibited the states as well as the federal government
from intervention in speech or press.15 St. George Tucker, a professor of
law at the College of William and Mary and a member of the Virginia high
court objected, however, to such a prohibition on the basis of federalism.
16
Despite his advocacy of an absolutist view of the First Amendment during
the Sedition Act controversy of 1798, Tucker argued that individual states
should be left to their own devices. He stated in debate: "It will be much
better, I apprehend, to leave the state governments to themselves, and not to
interfere with them more than we already do; and that is thought by many to
be rather too much. I therefore move, sir, to strike out these words."
17
Madison countered that the guarantee of speech and press freedoms was
"the most valuable amendment in the whole list" and would be meaningless
unless equally applicable to the states. 18 The House of Representatives,
13. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 757-84 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789) [hereinafter cited as
ANNALS 1].
14. Id. at 766 (remarks of J. Madison).
15. This draft of the First Amendment provided: "Article 1. Section 10, between the first
and second paragraph, insert 'no State shall infringe the equal rights of conscience, nor the
freedom of speech or of the press, nor of the right of trial by jury in criminal cases.' "ANNALS
1, supra note 13, at 783-84. For commentary, see G. ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTrrUTIONALIST 56
(1971); L. LEvY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN
HISTORY 221-23 (1960) [hereinafter cited as LEGACY].
16. See BERNS, supra note 11, at 114-15; LEGACY, supra note 15, at 282-83; ANNALS 1,
supra note 13, at 783-84.
17. ANNALS 1, supra note 15, at 783-84.
18. Id. at 784.
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persuaded by Madison, approved a draft of the First Amendment that
explicitly applied to the states. 19 If the Senate had not subsequently excised
the controversial interdiction, the First Amendment would have contained
the only provision in the Bill of Rights clearly restraining the states in their
relations with the citizenry.20 The record is silent on the ground for Senate
action. Did the Senate intend to narrow the scope of the First Amendment
solely out of deference to principles of federalism and states' rights, or did
the Senate actually believe that states could regulate speech and press if they
chose to do so?
An examination of early state constitutions also fails to elucidate the
original understanding as to the extent to which the states themselves could
protect or regulate the freedoms of speech and press. In the constitutions of
the thirteen original states, twelve left speech unprotected. 2 Only Pennsyl-
vania secured the right of free speech in its first constitution of 1776.1 The
absence of protection in other state constitutions was not necessarily the
result of oversight. Massachusetts specifically rejected a variant of Pennsyl-
vania's free speech clause that provided only for a free press. 23 Moreover,
New Jersey and New York completely omitted both speech and press
protections from their constitutions.24 Such an omission makes the task of
reconstruction extremely difficult.
A plausible explanation for the absence of speech and press protections
in these constitutions was provided by Alexander Hamilton. In Number
Eighty-four of the Federalist Papers, Hamilton contended that written
speech and press protections established inherently unworkable standards;
true protection for liberty of press depended on the spirit of a people, not on
the letter of the law.
What signifies a declaration, that "the liberty of the press shall be
inviolably preserved?" What is the liberty of the press? Who can
give it any definition which would not leave the utmost latitude for
evasion? I hold it to be impracticable; and from this, I infer, that
its security, whatever fine declarations may be inserted in any
constitution respecting it, must altogether depend on public opin-
ion, and on the general spirit of the people and of the govern-
ment.3
Because of this deep-seated faith in the spirit of the people, Hamilton
opposed a national, and by implication, state Bill of Rights as being
19. Id.
20. G. ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST 56 (1971).
21. LEGACY, supra note 15, at 184-85.
22. See id. at 183.
23. Id. at 184.
24. Id. at 185.
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 580 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
[Vol. 5
superfluous and possibly harmful in that it could undermine the principle of
popular sovereignty and the doctrine of enumerated powers.
I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to
the extent in which they are contended for, are not only unneces-
sary in the proposed Constitution, but would even be dangerous.
They would contain various exceptions to powers not granted;
and, on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to
claim more than were granted.
26
In short, Hamilton feared that the First Amendment's interdiction could
erroneously be interpreted as presupposing the authority to regulate the
freedoms of speech and press, thereby affording either state or federal
officials with a plausible pretense to claim power that did not exist. His
position in Number Eighty-four of the Federalist Papers supports a max-
imum protection view of the First Amendment. It builds upon the premise
that there is no authority to interfere with the expression of the people in a
democratic system of government.
The eighteenth century concept of popular sovereignty, similar to that
espoused by Hamilton, is also useful in the determination of whether British
common law limitations on the freedoms of speech and press survived the
American revolution. The idea of a sovereign people supports the right of
every man to speak freely. A government that is the people's agent, existing
by their consent, has no authority to silence their criticism. Alexis De
Tocqueville focused on popular sovereignty as the root of freedoms of
speech and press in the American republic:
The sovereignty of the people and the freedom of the press are
therefore two entirely correlative things, whereas censorship and
universal suffrage contradict each other and cannot long remain in
the political institutions of the same people. Among the twelve
million people living in the territory of the United States, there is
not one single man who has dared to suggest restricting the free-
dom of the press. 27
De Tocqueville's analysis recognizes the inherent contradiction between
popular sovereignty and the very concept of seditious libel, thereby support-
ing an absolutist view of the First Amendment:
Americans, having accepted the dogma of sovereignty of the
people, apply it with perfect sincerity. . . . [C]ourts are power-
less to check the press; . . . . [W]here the press is concerned,
there is not in reality any middle path between license and ser-
vitude. To cull the inestimable benefits assured by freedom of the
press, it is necessary to put up with the inevitable evils springing
therefrom.
28
26. Id. at 579.
27. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 182 (1969).
28. Id. at 183.
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In theory, then, popular sovereignty should have displaced the crime of
seditious libel, which had been nurtured by a philosophical perspective that
elevated the rulers of the world to a position of superiority over the people.
29
The value protected by the British common law crime was the people's
respect of and affection for such a form of government, and the crux of the
offense was* the tendency of the speech to instill disaffection. As stated by
Chief Justice Holt in Tutchin's Case in 1704: "If People should not be
called to account for possessing the People with an ill Opinion of the
Government, no Government can subsist. For it is very necessary for all
Governments that the People should have a good Opinion of it." 30 In a
similar vein, Sir William Blackstone also recognized the crime of seditious
libel in defining the outer limits of speech and press freedoms by the absence
of prior restraint.
In this and the other instances which we have lately considered,
where blasphemous, immoral, treasonable, schismatical, sediti-
ous, or scandalous libels are punished by the English law, some
with a greater, others with a less, degree of severity, the liberty of
the press, properly understood, is by no means infringed or vio-
lated. The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a
free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon
publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter
when published.
3'
Practical realization of the theoretical antagonism between Black-
stone's limitations on freedoms of the press through seditious libel and the
concept of popular sovereignty developed only after the Sedition Act
controversy of 1798.32 In Pennsylvania, the one state that secured both the
freedoms of speech and press, for example, these freedoms were interpreted
as consistent with the Blackstonian view. In 1788, Chief Justice Thomas
McKean, a signatory to the Declaration of Independence and president of
the Continental Congress, ruled that the constitutional guarantee of a free
press in Pennsylvania and the federal Bill of Rights did not alter British
common law.
What then is the meaning of the Bill of Rights, and the Constitu-
tion of Pennsylvania, when they declare, "That the freedom of the
press shall not be restrained," and "that the printing presses shall
29. See generally FREEDOM'S FETrERs, supra note 1, at 418-33;JUDGMENTS, supra note 11,
at 147.
30. This excerpt from Tutchin's Case, Regina v. Tutchin, 14 Howell's St. Tr. 1095 (1704),
was read to the jury during the libel trial of journalist John Peter Zenger in 1735 by James
DeLancey, Chief Justice of Pennsylvania. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON
60 (L. Levy ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as FREEDOM OF THE PRESS]. See also LEGACY, supra
note 15, at 10 & n.14.
31. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1769), reprinted in
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 30, at 104.
32. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-75 (1964).
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be free to every person who undertakes to examine the proceed-
ings of the legislature, or any part of the government?" . ..
[Tihey effectually preclude any attempt to fetter the press by the
institution of a licenser. The same principles were settled in Eng-
land, so far back as the reign of William the Third, and since that
time, we all know, there has been the freest animadversion upon
the conduct of the ministers of that nation.
33
In 1790, Pennsylvania adopted a new constitution, which had been drafted
principally by James Wilson, an influential framer of the United States
Constitution. Freedom of the press was again guaranteed, but once more
with the caveat of citizen responsibility for abuse of that liberty.94 Wilson
explained the proposed constitution to members of the Pennsylvania assem-
bly, commenting also on the proposed First Amendment to the federal
constitution, as follows:
I presume it was not in the view of the honorable gentleman to say
there is no such thing as a libel, or that the writers of such ought
not to be punished. The idea of the liberty of the press, is not
carried so far as this in any country-what is meant by the liberty
of the press is, that there should be no antecedent restraint upon
it; but that every author is responsible when he attacks the securi-
ty or welfare of the government, or the safety, character and
property of the individual.
35
Chief Justice McKean also interpreted the new Pennsylvania constitution to
be consistent with the common law: "The liberty of the press is, indeed,
essential to the nature of a free State, but this consists in laying no previous
restraints upon public actions, and not in freedom from censure for criminal
matter, when published."
36
Another perspective on the meaning of the freedoms of speech and
press in eighteenth century America may be found in the exchange of letters
in 1789 between William Cushing, Chief Justice of Massachusetts, and John
Adams. Cushing wrote to Adams inquiring whether the Massachusetts
Constitution's guarantee of a free press embodied or altered Blackstonian
principles:
Judge Blackstone says. . . the liberty of the press consists in
laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in free-
dom from censure for criminal matter, when published. Wherein
he refers to a public licenser, inspector or controller of the press.
That is, no doubt, the liberty of the press as allowed by the law of
England.
33. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 30, at 138-39. This excerpt is from the libel
prosecution of Eleanor Oswald, printer of the Independent Gazetteer in Philadelphia.
34. LEGACY, supra note 15, at 203.
35. Address of James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 1, 1787), reprint-
ed in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 30, at 130.
36. STATE TRIALS OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE ADMINISTRATION OF WASHINGTON
AND ADAMS 323-24 (F. Wharton ed. 1849) (libel trial of William Cobbett), reprinted in LEGACY,
supra note 15, at 206.
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But the words of our article understood according to plain
English, make no such distinction, and must exclude subsequent
restraints, as much as previous restraints ...
The question upon the article is this-What is that liberty of
the press, which is essential to the security of freedom?
37
John Adams replied:
The difficult and important question is whether the Truth of
words can be admitted by the court to be given in evidence to the
jury, upon a plea of not guilty? In England I suppose it is settled.
But it is a serious Question whether our Constitution is not at
present so different as to render the innovation necessary?. . . I
therefore, am very clear that under the Articles of our Constitu-
tion which you have quoted, it would be safest to admit evidence
to the jury of the Truth of accusations, and if the jury found them
true and that they were published for the Public good, they would
readily acquit.
38
Adams' reply has dual significance. While it goes significantly beyond
British common law in permitting a defendant to introduce evidence to
prove the truth of the "libel," it also seems to provide that truth is not a
defense per se. Truth is relevant only insofar as it tends to show honesty of
motive, offsetting any inference of malice that could be drawn from the
statement in issue. This distinction is troublesome, however, because it
would permit a conviction for governmental criticism that is true if it is
made with malice. The Cushing-Adams correspondence is nevertheless a
rare exposition of the meaning of free press prior to the Sedition Act
controversy of 1798, 39 and indicates a broad understanding of the freedom
of both speech and press even while it accommodates a variant of British
seditious libel law. Ironically, the Sedition Act of 1798, which nearly
abolished the freedom of speech and press, was signed by John Adams, but
it embodied the very reforms in the law of seditious libel that he had
proposed in his letter to Cushing.
Like Hamilton and Adams, Thomas Jefferson also assumed that state
prosecutions for false statements were harmonious with a free press. His
draft of the Virginia Constitution in 1783 proposed that the press "shall be
subject to no other restraint than liableness to legal prosecution for false
facts printed and published.'4" This clause was designed to amend Vir-
ginia's Declaration of Rights of 1776, which broadly proclaimed, "[t]hat
the freedom of the press is one of the great bulwarks of liberty, and can
37. Letter from William Cushing to John Adams (Feb. 18, 1789), reprintedin FREEDOM OF
THE PREss, supra note 30, at 150 (citation omitted).
38. Letter from John Adams to William Cushing (Mar. 7, 1789), reprinted in FREEDOM OF
THE PRESs, supra note 30, at 153.
39. LEGACY, supra note 15, at 196.
40. L. LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE 46 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES].
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never be restrained but by despotic governments." 41 In 1788, Jefferson
reiterated his position in favor of prosecution for "false facts." In his letters
to James Madison, he urged Madison to support a federal Bill of Rights,
"[a] declaration that the federal government will never restrain the presses
from printing anything they please, will not take away the liability of the
printers for false facts printed. "42 Jefferson's "false facts" limitation on the
right to freedom of press is especially significant in light of his creation of
the "overt acts" test, which insured the free exercise of religion. By
limiting the government's power to interfere with free religious expression
to those instances in which it "break out into overt acts against peace and
good order." 43 Jefferson's "overt acts" standard provided more protection
for such expression than Blackstone's "bad tendency" test for political
speech,44 but Jefferson did not advocate a corresponding "overt acts" test to
limit prosecution of the press for "false facts" printed, although he had
ample opportunity to do so.
The problem in reconstructing the original meaning of the First
Amendment thus centers on a deep and unspoken ambivalence of the
founding fathers concerning the primacy of free speech and press in the new
republic. Although the drafters of the Bill of Rights uniformly declared the
supremacy of the freedoms of speech and press, none questioned whether
these freedoms yielded to or repudiated the common law crime of seditious
libel. At most, there were proposals for a relaxation of the libel laws, but
even then, the result was not reached by analyzing the contradiction between
British common law and a free press. In addition to the drafters' reluctance
to recognize the antagonism between popular sovereignty and seditious
libel, principles of federalism restrained the fledgling Congress from
commanding the states on matters considered to be internal affairs. The
Senate's excision of the clause designed to restrain the states as well as the
federal government in abridging the freedom of speech and press supports
the thesis that the First Amendment was primarily a statement of the
exclusive authority of the states to regulate speech and press.45 When the
Bill of Rights was adopted, it would appear that the founding fathers had not
achieved a thorough understanding of the freedoms of speech and press,
although they had recognized rudimentary principles that would later pro-
vide the basis for maximum protection of these rights. It is thus not
surprising that a "national awareness of the central meaning of the First
Amendment" did not crystallize until "the great controversy over the
41. Id.
42. Id. at 48.
43. JUDGMENTS, supra note 11, at 134.
44. Id. See also BERNS, supra note 11, at 81-82.
45. See JUDGMENTS, supra note 11, at 138.
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Sedition Act of 1798.' "46 Out of this controversy as well emerged the
maximum protection theory of the First Amendment, so conspicuously
absent in the debates of the First Congress.
II. The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine
In 1798 the Federalists enacted the Sedition Act,47 which was allegedly
designed to "protect" the federal government against advocates of subver-
sion.48 The law established a federal statutory crime of seditious libel. 49
Ironically, the Sedition Act incorporated a liberal definition of the common
law crime, allowing truth as a defense and expanding jury powers.
50
The speeches of Harrison Gray Otis of Massachusetts exemplify the
position legitimatizing the Sedition Act. Otis argued that the First Amend-
ment's guarantee of the rights of freedom of speech and press reinforced
Blackstonian principles, according to which the freedom of press "is merely
an exemption from all previous restraints. "51 He actually read from Black-
stone's Commentaries to support his justification of the repressive mea-
sure.52 For illustration, Otis cited laws of New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia, and, for added support, he quoted Chief Justice
McKean in the Oswald case.53 Otis' position carried majority support and
the Sedition Law passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 44 to
41.54
By contrast, opponents of the Sedition Act challenged its constitution-
ally impermissible nature on three distinct grounds. First, they argued that
the Act went beyond the enumerated powers of the federal government.5 -
Second, it intruded into an area reserved exclusively for state regulation.
56
46. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964).
47. FREEDOM'S FEITERS, supra note 1, at 418-33; BERNS, supra note 11, at 86-146.
48. The Sedition Act had an expiration date of March 3, 1801, which was one day after the
inauguration of the next President. Ch. 74, § 4, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
49. Ch. 74, §§ 1-4, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
50. Id. at §§ 1-2.
51. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 2148 (1798). In 1791, Otis had defended Edmund Freeman, an
editor, against a charge of gross libel upon a member of the state legislature. LEGACY, supra
note 15, at 207-08.
52. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 2148 (1798) (remarks of Rep. Otis).
53. Id. at 2148-49. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
54. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 2171 (1798).
55. See id. at 2139:
Mr. Nicholas rose, he said, to ask an explanation of the principles upon which this bill
is founded. He confessed it was strongly impressed upon his mind, that it was not
within the powers of the House to act upon this subject. He looked in vain amongst the
enumerated powers given to Congress in the Constitution, for an authority to pass a
law like the present.
56. Id. at 2151:
Mr. Macon then proceeded ...to show, from the opinions of the friends of the
[Vol. 5
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The third challenge, which took a back seat to the more traditional lines of
attack, was based on the novel theory that seditious libel was antithetical to
free speech and to a free press. In retrospect, these challenges blur under the
aegis of the First Amendment, which supported not only claims of states'
rights, but also the freedom of speech and press. But the loudest outcry
against the federal seditious libel law came from those who claimed that the
First Amendment was the states' bulwark against federal intrusion.
Thomas Jefferson, author of the Kentucky resolution that condemned
the Sedition Act, did not question the authority of state governments to
prosecute citizens for the offense; rather, he claimed that Congress had
acted in excess of its authority in enacting the law. His claim was grounded
both in a states' rights reading of the First Amendment and in the doctrine of
enumerated powers:
[A]nother and more special provision has been made by one of the
amendments to the Constitution which expressly declares, that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press," thereby guarding in the same
sentence, and under the same words, the freedom of religion, of
speech, and of the press, insomuch, that whatever violates either,
throws down the sanctuary which covers the others, and that
libels, falsehoods, defamation equally with heresy and false reli-
gion, are withheld from the cognizance of Federal tribunals. That
therefore [the Sedition Act], which does abridge the freedom of
the press, is not law, but is altogether void and of no effect.
57
In attacking the Sedition Act, Jefferson's position was consistent with his
earlier statements concerning state power to regulate speech. According to
Jefferson, the states retained the common law power to punish the press for
false declaration; accordingly, he had excised protection for publication of
"false facts" from the term freedom of the press secured in the Constitu-
tion.58 His limited definition of that term is borne out in an 1803 letter to
Pennsylvania Governor McKean, 59 in which Jefferson advocated a few
"wholesome" state prosecutions of a "licentious" federalist press, under
Constitution, that it was never understood that prosecutions for libels could take place
under the General Government; but that they must be carried on in the State courts, as
the Constitution gave no power to Congress to pass laws on this subject.
57. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTrrUTION 541 (J. Elliot ed. 1942), quoted in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note
30, at 352. Even James Madison's condemnation of the Act can be interpreted as not question-
ing the relation between the principles of seditious libel and free speech. In his speech to the
Virginia Assembly, Madison claimed that "[elvery libellous writing or expression might receive
its punishment in the State courts .... " LEGACY, supra note 15, at 266.
58. See generally JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 40.
59. Prior to assuming office as governor, Thomas McKean was Chief Justice of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
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the guise of restoring newspaper credibility: "And I have therefore long
thought that a few prosecutions of the most prominent offenders would have
a wholesome effect in restoring the integrity of the presses.' ' 6 In an 1804
letter to Abigail Adams, he reiterated his view: "While we deny that
Congress have a right to control the freedom of the press, we have ever
asserted the right of the States, and their exclusive right, to do so.'61 To his
credit, Jefferson pardoned all those who had been convicted under the
expired federalist Sedition Act upon assuming the office of Presidency.
62
Outrage over the Sedition Act's impingement on states' rights did not
necessitate a rethinking of the First Amendment's impact on common law
limitations on the freedom of speech and press. A states' rights attack could
safely proceed along well-established lines. Nevertheless, there were those
who did confront the antagonism between the First Amendment and sediti-
ous libel; in so doing, they developed an independent challenge to the laws
of seditious libel. The very concept of prosecuting those who publicly
criticized the government and its officials, they objected, was the product of
repressive and tyrannical thinking and therefore inconsistent with the
concepts of freedom and civil liberty. The following expression by
Congressman Albert Gallatin in 1798 is consistent with the modem
consensus:
[L]aws against writings of this kind had uniformly been one of the
most powerful engines used by tyrants to prevent the diffusion of
knowledge, to throw a veil on their folly or their crimes, to satisfy
those mean passions which always denote little minds, and to
perpetuate their own tyranny. The principles of the law of political'
libels were found in the rescripts of the worst Emperors of Rome,
in the decisions of the Star Chamber. . . . [To resort to coercion
and punishments in order to suppress writings attacking their
measures, was to confess that these could not be defended by any
other means.63
Gallatin's political consciousness suggests an empathetic grasp of the natu-
ral displacement of seditious libel by a popular form of government. Intel-
lectually, he could not accept a "liberalized" version of libel, unlike
Adams, Cushing, Hamilton or Jefferson, who, despite disputes of party
politics, were unified in legitimatizing the concept of seditious libel itself.
Gallatin would, therefore, interpret the First Amendment as repudiating
British common law-a major advance in American constitutional theory.
60. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas McKean (Feb. 19, 1803), reprinted in
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 30, at 364.
61. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. I1, 1804), reprinted in FREE-
DOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 30, at 367.
62. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964); Kelly, CriminalLibel and
Free Speech, 6 U. KAN. L. REv. 295, 315 (1958).
63. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 2164 (1798).
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Gallatin argued that the First Amendment protected the press from
subsequent punishment as well as from prior restraint, eschewing the Black-
stonian claim that liberty remained unbridled while sedition alone was the
target of abuse.
[T]he amendment. . . declares. . . that Congress shall pass no
law abridging the freedom of speech or the liberty of the
press. . . .The sense, in which he and his friends understood this
amendment, was that Congress could not pass any law to punish
any real or supposed abuse of the press. . . .[I]t appeared to him
preposterous to say, that to punish a certain act was not an
abridgement of the liberty of doing that act. It appeared to him
that it was an insulting evasion of the Constitution for gentlemen
to say, "We claim no power to abridge the liberty of the press;
that, you shall enjoy unrestrained. You may write and publish
what you please, but if you publish anything against us, we will
punish you for it. So long as we do not prevent, but only punish
your writings, it is no abridgment of your liberty of writing and
printing." Congress were by that amendment prohibited from
passing any law abridging, &c.; they were, therefore, prohibited
from adding any restraint, either by previous restrictions, or by
subsequent punishment, or by any alteration of the proper juris-
diction, or of the mode of trial, which did not exist before; in
short, they were under an obligation of leaving that subject where
they found it-of passing no law, either directly or indirectly,
affecting that liberty. 64
To those who countered that the "liberal" provisions of the law allowed an
accused to raise the defense of truth, Gallatin pointed out the inadequacy of
truth as a defense to criminal libel.
It was true that, so far as related merely to facts, a man would be
acquitted by proving that what he asserted was true. But the bill
was intended to punish solely writings of a political nature, libels
against the Government, the President, or either branch of the
Legislature; and it was well known that writings, containing
animadversions on public measures, almost always contained not
only facts but opinion. And how could the truth of opinions be
proven by evidence?65
The repressive nature of the Sedition Act generated the political consci-
ousness that was necessary to appreciate the antagonism between seditious
libel and free speech in a democracy. Like Gallatin, John Nicholas of
Virginia, for example, collapsed the distinction between liberty and license
as standards with which to delimit the bounds of improper exercise of the
freedom of speech and press; he argued that the defense of truth was
deficient. 66 Nicholas set forth the sophisticated theory that the First Amend-
ment also protects the public's right to free speech and a free press. "If this
64. Id. at 2159-60 (remarks of A. Gallatin).
65. Id. at 2162.
66. Id. at 2140.
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bill be passed into a law, the people will be deprived of that information on
public measures, which they have a right to receive, and which is the life
and support of a free Government. "67 Building upon the House debates,
Tunis Wortman, a New York lawyer prominent in Tammany politics, also
expanded upon the theoretical ground for a maximum protection under-
standing of the First Amendment. In his book, Treatise Concerning Politic-
al Enquiry and the Liberty of the Press,68 published in 1800, Wortman
fleshes out the inherently political nature of a libel prosecution: "A statute
of sedition may stifle the open declarations of dissatisfaction . . but (is)
illy calculated for permanent establishment of tranquility or for effecting a
radical cure of complaint."- 69 George Hay, writing under the pen name
Hortensius, also interpreted language of the First Amendment as expressly
forbidding legislation punishing the written or spoken word. 70 Hay analyzed
the relationship between popular sovereignty and the First Amendment, and
concluded that limitation of the press to British notions of freedom of the
press was meaningless in a country in which the people are the sovereign
rulers: "The freedom of the press, therefore means the total exemption of
the press from any kind of legislative control, and consequently the Sedition
Bill, which is an act of legislative control is an abridgement of its liberty and
expressly forbidden by the constitution."
71
Yet, even with expiration of the Sedition Act in 1801, the horizon in
American libertarian theory remained beyond the politics of the day. In
1804, Harry Croswell, editor of a New York journal, The Wasp, was
convicted of seditious libel upon Thomas Jefferson. 72 The common law
indictment did not charge false or wanton criticism of the President, but
hearkened back to principles of royal sovereignty, alleging that Croswell
had represented President Jefferson as "unworthy the confidence, respect
and attachment of the people. . . [thereby] alienat[ing] and withdraw[ing]
. . . obedience, fidelity, and allegiance of the citizens . . .,".73 The ap-
peal, argued by Alexander Hamilton, resulted in liberalization of state libel
laws and allowed truth as a defense, but did not lead to the repudiation of the
crime itself. 74 Such accusations were all too reminiscent of those by the
67. Id.
68. T. WORTMAN, TREATISE CONCERNING POLITICAL ENQUIRY AND LIBERTY OF THE PRESS
(1800).
69. Id. at 164.
70. G. HAY, Two ESSAYS ON THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS (1799).
71. Id. at 30.
72. Source material for the Croswell trial is found in BERNS, supra note 11, at 128-31;
LEGACY, supra note 15, at 297-99; FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 30, at 377-99; Beauhar-
nais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 295-99 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
73. People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337, 338 (N.Y. 1804).
74. Although Hamilton's argument did not carry a majority of tbe New York appellate
court, which was evenly divided on the appeal, the state legislature revised the common law
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royal governor in the King's colonial court against journalist John Peter
Zenger in 1735. 75 Although Zenger's ultimate acquittal is heralded in the
annals of freedom of the press as the popular repudiation of British seditious
libel in colonial America, the verdict was more clearly attributable to
forceful defense counsel and the jury's willingness to ignore the King's law
by exercising its inherent powers of nullification.
76 After all, the law of
seditious libel survived the Zenger case.
Conclusion
Even though the modem consensus is that the Sedition Act of 1798
violated the First Amendment guarantee of the rights to freedom of speech
and press, the proposition that the First Amendment at its adoption re-
pudiated the common law crime of seditious libel remains doubtful. The
modem understanding of the First Amendment as securing maximum pro-
tection for civil rights is not the work of alchemy or historical error, but
rather is the product of developing principles of popular sovereignty and of
freedom of speech and press. The antagonism between the First Amendment
and the sedition law represents the historical gap between theoretical princi-
ple and practical contingencies of the everyday political world in which
theory must find its expression. Resolution of this historic conflict produced
the maximum protection of First Amendment guarantees, thereby eliminat-
ing the very notion of seditious libel itself.
definition of seditious libel in 1805 along lines suggested in the opinion of Judge Kent. LEGACY,
supra note 15, at 299; BERNS, supra note 11, at 142.
75. See generally G. DARGO, ROOTS OF THE REPUBLIC: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON EARLY
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM, 108-28 (1974); LEGACY, supra note 15, at 129-33; JUDGMENTS,
supra note 11, at 117-25. Zenger was charged with criminally libeling the colonial governor of
New York, William Cosby, through articles in his paper, Weekly Journal.
76. The trial judge, James DeLancey, had refused Zenger's request to admit evidence
proving the truth of the allegedly libelous remarks: "Mr. Ch. Justice: You cannot be admitted
. . . to give the Truth of a Libel in Evidence. A Libel is not to be justified; for it is nevertheless
a Libel that it is true." FREEDOM OFTHE PRESS, supra note 30, at 47. Ignoring the court's ruling,
Andrew Hamilton, the defense attorney, presented his case to the jury, essentially arguing for
jury nullification:
[E]very Man who prefers Freedom to a Life of Slavery will bless and honour You, as
Men who have baffled the Attempt of Tyranny; and by an impartial and uncorrupt
Verdict, have laid a noble Foundation for securing to ourselves, our posterity, and our
Neighbours, That, to which Nature and the Laws of our Country have given us a
Right-The Liberty-both of exposing and opposing arbitrary Power (in these Parts of
the World, at least) by speaking and writing Truth.
Id. at 59.
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